INTRODUCTION
In Murray v. Giarratano,' a plurality of the United States Supreme Court refused to establish a constitutional right of state appointed counsel for indigent death row inmates seeking state postconviction appeals. The plurality argued that equal protection and due process rights to state appointed attorneys, which the Constitution guarantees to prisoners for mandatory appeals, satisfies the accuracy of the capital process. Denying that tension exists in the prisoner rights line of cases, the plurality embraced the categorical approach of earlier assistance of counsel cases to conclude that the Constitution does not mandate state appointed attorneys for state postconviction appeals.
Basing its argument on the fourteenth amendment, the dissent maintained that capital cases' special procedural treatments at trial and direct appeal fail to meet the accuracy necessary in a death penalty case. The dissent also highlighted the important issues unique to collateral appeals and the death row inmate's hardship in raising these matters while awaiting his or her execution. The dissent distinguished the right to assistance of counsel cases from the issue under consideration because those cases had not dealt with the death sentence.
This Note argues that the plurality arbitrarily limited a line of prisoner rights precedent that leads naturally to a constitutional right to state appointed counsel in death penalty postconviction appeals. In light of the realistic inability of death row inmates to purl 109 S. Ct. 2765 Ct. (1989 .
sue postconviction relief, the plurality should have extended the right to state appointed counsel to include state postconviction appeals. Also, after sampling policy reasons for the right to counsel in postconviction appeals, this Note illustrates through a simple procedural due process analysis the need for fourteenth amendment, rather than legislative, protection of this important safeguard in our capital adjudication process.
II. BACKGROUND
Murray is the latest indigent prisoner rights decision involving the due process and equal protection clauses 2 of the fourteenth and sixth amendments. 3 These precedents break into sometimes converging, but analytically distinct, right-to-counsel and meaningful access categories. 4 Murray applies these doctrines to state capital collateral appeals. 5
A. INDIGENTS' RIGHTS TO STATE APPOINTED COUNSEL
The Court in Powell v. Alabama 6 held that indigent prisoners accused of state capital offenses had the right to court appointed counsel at trial. In that case, the Court held that the right to the assistance of counsel was applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment because it was part of the "fundamental character" of due process. 7 Alabama might not refuse to those defendants the opportunity to hire counsel or receive state-appointed lawyers. 8 The Court's decisions in Gideon v. Wainwright 9 and Douglas v. California 1 0 extended the right to counsel to include criminal cases and mandatory appeals, respectively. I In Douglas, the Court relied on the due process clause to invalidate a California rule requiring an ex-parte judicial hearing before appointing counsel to an indigent defendant's appeal of right.1 2 Although the state could have considered some economic differences among litigants,' 3 it might not have singled out the poor for ex-parte determinations of guilt before the appeal. 1 4 This procedure would have forced indigents to undergo a "meaningless ritual" without a lawyer, whereas a wealthier defendant could have enjoyed the privilege of a significant appeal unburdened by the ex-parte determination.' 5 The Court also carved out limitations to this expanding right. An indigent prisoner does not have a constitutional right to counsel 8 Id. at 71. 9 372 U.S. 335 (1963) . 10 372 U. S. 353 (1963) . 11 These decisions followed earlier cases expanding a defendant's right to assistance of counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (criminal defendants in federal court have an automatic right to state appointed counsel). But see Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (the sixth and fourteenth amendments do not require state appointed attorneys for all state criminal trials in all circumstances), overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) .
12 Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356. 13 The Court stated, "But it is appropriate to observe that a State can, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for differences so long as the result does not amount to a denial of due process or an invidious discrimination." Id. (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) ).
14 The Court used far more stirring language in Gideon when it stated, "[n]ot only these precedents but also reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
15 Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358. The Court stated, "For there can be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the amount of money he has. ' " Id. at 355 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) ).
The Court later extended the right to counsel line of cases to acknowledge the state's constitutional duty to provide counsel in misdemeanor cases where imprisonment could result, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25 (1972) , and to include a right to effective counsel. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387 (1985) (the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the first appeal of right); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (the sixth amendment right to counsel includes a right to effective assistance of counsel); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (on appeal of right, appointed counsel cannot withdraw from a case he deems meritless without first following certain constitutionally required procedures). Though collateral appeals often claim ineffective assistance of counsel in earlier proceedings, these issues remain outside the scope of this Note. The right to an attorney must be decided before a right to effective counsel arises. [Vol. 80 for discretionary appeals to state supreme courts or to the United States Supremd Court. 16 Similarly, in Pennsylvania v. Finley, ' 7 the Court refused to acknowledge a constitutional right to state appointed counsel in state postconviction proceedings. ' In these cases, the Court distinguished trials, in which the state seeks to strip the presumption of innocence from the defendant, from appeals, in which the accused initiates the adjudication to overturn a prior determination of guilt. 19 Because in a discretionary appeal the state does not force the defendant into court to prove his guilt, its refusal to appoint counsel to him does not violate due process. The Court in Ross further noted that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 2 ' does not mandate complete equality among litigants. 2 2 Moreover, state discretionary reviews are not intended to address the guilt of the accused. 23 Rather, such reviews usually center on constitutional questions or interesting legal issues. 2 4 The indigent prisoner's pro se petitions and records of earlier materials suffice for this type of review. 2 5 Finally, if discretionary appeals garner no constitutional right to counsel, then neither do collateral appeals. Thus, prior to Murray, both state and federal courts had right to assistance obligations where imprisonment could result.
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Although the right included an appeal of right, it did not encompass discretionary or non-death penalty collateral appeals. 16 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) .
481 U.S. 551 (1987).
18 Id. In this case, appointed counsel for an indigent prisoner decided his client had no basis for a habeas corpus petition. Rather than meeting the constitutionally required process for withdrawing from a wholly frivolous appeal, counsel simply notified the Court of his intention to drop the case. The Court held that the attorney had no constitutional obligation to follow the procedure for withdrawing from an appeal of right. Because a prisoner had no right to appointed counsel for discretionary appeals, he or she also had no right on collateral attack, and an attorney need not follow a constitutionally mandated procedure before withdrawing. Id. at 557. § 1983 (1982) .
The other principle type of postconviction proceeding is a writ of habeas corpus. Federal habeas corpus review has been codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A successful motion under this statute requires that the individual be imprisoned against the Constitution, laws or treaties of the U.S., and that she first exhaust state remedies by raising the question at issue in all possible state procedures. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (d) (1982) .
39 Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1986 ). 40 Id. When other death row inmates intervened, the district court certified the group as a class. The formal description of the class was as follows:
[A]II persons, now and in the future, sentenced to death in Virginia, whose sentences have been or are subsequently affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court and who either (1) cannot afford to retain and do not have attorneys to represent them in connection with their post-conviction proceedings, or (2) could not afford to retain and did not have attorneys to represent them in connection with a particular post-conviction proceeding. require appointed counsel for death row postconviction actions. 4 2 The district court highlighted the unique position of Virginia death row inmates: they faced a limited time in which to prepare petitions, confronted complex legal procedures, and suffered the strain of preparing themselves and their families for the imminent execution. 4 3 These unique circumstances compelled the district court to find law library access insufficient to satisfy meaningful access requirements. 44 Likewise, both institutional lawyers serving multiple prisoners on a limited basis and personal attorneys appointed after a prisoner filed a nonfrivolous petition fall short of satisfying the constitutional mandate. 45 Too few institutional attorneys serve too many inmates in too limited a fashion. 46 Furthermore, attorneys come into the litigation too late to do a major portion of the work when the court appoints them after the prisoner files a nonfrivolous motion. 4 7 Finally, the district court argued that additional appointment rights would not impose substantial financial burdens because the state already had appointed counsel to nonfrivolous claims.
48
The district court limited its holding to state habeas corpus petitions because the underlying right to state appointed counsel excludes federal discretionary appeals. 4 9 This limitation followed the tenet that states should not fund counsel for an individual seeking relief under a federal statute. 50 The district court added that exhaustion requirements would supply federal courts with the advantage of earlier materials on all issues possibly raised. 5 45 Id. at 514. 46 The district court stated: Currently there are seven institutional attorneys attempting to meet the needs of over 2,000 prisoners. No pretense is made by the defendants in this case that these few attorneys could handle the needs of death row prisoners in addition to providing assistance to other inmates.... Moreover, they are not hired to work full time; they split time between their private practice and their institutional work. ...
... The scope of assistance these attorneys provide is simply too limited. The evidence indicated that they do not perform factual inquiries of the kind necessitated by death penalty issues. They act only as legal advisors or, to borrow the phrase of one such attorney, as "talking law books." Id.
47 Id. 48 The district court also noted that the burden would be slight because of the small number of prisoners placed on death row each year. Id. 49 [Vol. 80 of state appointed attorneys for state capital postconviction appeal. 52 The class of prisoners cross-appealed the district court's refusal to include a right to assistance of counsel in federal appeals.
3
Finding the district court's factual findings clearly erroneous, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. 54 The court deemed Finley 55 -decidedafter the district court's opinion in Giarratano-controlling precedent. 5 6 It dismissed Bounds as not entailing a right to counsel. 5 7 Finally, the court limited consideration of any "significant constitutional difference" of death penalty cases to the trial phase.
58
After en banc reconsideration, the circuit court affirmed the district court's decision. 59 The circuit court determined that the lower • court's findings were not clearly erroneous. 60 Finley had neither involved meaningful access, addressed Bounds, 6 1 nor discussed the death penalty. 62 Finally, the court acknowledged that society's special interest in properly imposing death sentences required consideration of the punishment's "significant constitutional difference."
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconcile the circuit court's holding with Finley, and thereby determine whether or not a constitutional right to counsel exists in a postconviction proceeding.64 He deemed a limitation based on factual findings "even stranger jurisprudence" because the districts might then create varying constitutional rights to counsel. 77 These jurisdictional variations would become firmly entrenched because appellate courts could review them only on the "clearly erroneous" standard applicable to factual findings. 78 Finally, he argued that a factual-based constitutional standard would contravene the categorical approach to right-tocounsel cases used since Gideon.
79
Therefore, the Chief Justice extended the Finley Court's denial of a constitutional right to counsel in discretionary appellate proceedings to capital cases and forms of collateral review other than discretionary appeals. 80 Justice Kennedy disagreed with the plurality's diminution of the role of postconviction proceedings in the criminal justice process. 90 He admitted that the complexity of such proceedings greatly increases the difficulty of success without counsel. 9 ' Thus, he restricted his agreement with the plurality to the facts of this case. 90 Id. at 2772 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 91 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated, "The complexity of our jurisprudence in this area, moreover, makes it unlikely that capital defendants will be able to file successful petitions for collateral relief without the assistance of persons learned in the law." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). "On the facts and record of this case, I concur in the judgement of the court." Id. at 2773.
C. THE DISSENT
Dissenting, Justice Stevens 9 3 argued that the fourteenth amendment requires state appointed attorneys for the respondents.
94
Viewing right-to-counsel and meaningful access cases as a single line of authority, 9 5 he highlighted three factors unique to these death row inmates which triggers their right to appointed counsel. First, the dissent emphasized capital cases' special procedural treatment. 96 Maintaining that the trial and appeal of right does not assure accuracy in such an important and irreversible matter, he called for the continuation of these heightened procedural standards through the collateral appeal. 97 Justice Stevens dismissed Finley as irrelevant because it did not involve the death penalty. 9 8 Second, the significant role of collateral appeals in Virginia's capital trials further distinguishes Finley, a discretionary appeal, from a non-capital conviction. Postconviction proceedings provide the first opportunity to raise claims procedurally barred on direct review because trial counsel neglects to raise them. 9 9 Moreover, raising a claim, which a state court procedurally bars during collateral appeal, requires that the defendant show "cause for the default and resultant prejudice, or that failure to review [would] Far from creating a discrete constitutional right, Bounds constitutes one part of a jurisprudence that encompasses "right-to-counsel" as well as "access-to-courts" cases. Although each case is shaped by its facts, all share a concern, based upon the Fourteenth Amendment, that accused and convicted persons be permitted to seek legal remedies without arbitrary governmental interference. There is, however, significant evidence that in capital cases what is ordinarily considered direct review does not sufficiently safeguard against miscarriages ofjustice to warrant this presumption of finality. Federal habeas courts granted relief in only 0.25% to 7%o of non-capital cases in recent years; in striking contrast, the success rate in capital cases ranged from 60% to 70%. Such a high incidence of uncorrected error demonstrates that the meaningful appellate review" necessary in a capital case extends beyond the direct appellate process. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) .
98 Id. at 2776 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 2778 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
damental miscarriage of justice."' 0 0 These factors made state collateral appeal crucial to the capital conviction process.' 0 ' Third, Justice Stevens reiterated the circuit court's findings that death row inmates had been largely unable to mount successful collateral attacks. 10 2 Echoing the meaningful access cases, he concluded that Virginia's refusal to appoint counsel until after a nonfrivolous petition had been filed failed to "assure its indigent death row inmates an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly."' 0 3 Finally, Justice Stevens claimed that the state has no countervailing interest in denying counsel to the respondents. Because precedent fails to compel the denial of appointed counsel for death row inmates and because death row prisoners experience unique conditions, the Court should have extended the natural trend of meaningful access cases to include appointed counsel in state death penalty collateral appeals. 0 5 Furthermore, the lack of state interest to withhold counsel makes inconceivable the plurality's denial of state appointed attorneys beyond a trial of right.
A. PRECEDENT FAILS TO COMPEL THE PLURALITY'S DENIAL OF THE
RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN CAPITAL COLLATERAL
PROCEEDINGS
The plurality failed to recognize manifest tensions between the Bounds meaningful access and Finley right to counsel doctrines. The latter, 1 0 7 relying largely on Ross, denies constitutional rights to 100 Id. at 2779 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 103 Id. at 2780 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 104 Id. at 2781 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (due process does not require an evidentiary hearing in a disability benefit pretermination case)). Justice Stevens mentioned that Virginia already appointed counsel after the submission of nonfrivolous petitions, and that there were only 32 inmates on death row. Thus, the state would not incur large additional costs in supplying attorneys. Furthermore, because state appointed counsel would reduce the burden of frivolous or multiple petitions, Virginia would receive a net benefit from appointing attorneys before the filing of any pro se motion. assistance of counsel after mandatory appeals of right are completed. 10 8 The equal protection and due process doctrines discussed in Powell and Douglas extend to only one mandatory appeal. t0 9 In the meaningful access cases such as Bounds, however, the accused enjoys a "reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts." ' 1 0 The states must protect this right even if it means supplying law libraries or other types of legal assistance."'I Unlike the right to assistance of counsel, the meaningful access doctrine extends to postconviction procedures."
12
Because the plaintiffs in Murray were seeking collateral relief after mandatory appeals, the Finley line seems determinative of their rights to assistance of counsel. Special characteristics of death row inmates, however, make law libraries or institutional attorneys insufficient to meet the Bounds requirement of meaningful access. Thus, the Finley and Bounds lines of precedent plausibly reach opposite results in cases such as Murray.
13
The Court's list of special procedures applicable to capital trials but not to appeals 1 4 also fails to support a denial of counsel. Ostensibly, this list of examples rejects a death row petitioner's special rights based solely on the imposition of the death penalty. The lower court's extension of the Bounds meaningful access doctrine required that death row inmates receive, special treatment. Otherwise, the lower court would have had to argue for the much broader proposition that all capital convicts, or all convicts, have a constitutional right to counsel on collateral appeal.
Although somewhat meritorious, the Court's argument that special safeguards protect only the trial phase of a capital proceeding fails to justify denying the assistance of counsel to the Murray prisoners."1 5 The Court has stated that death penalty trials are The plurality's categorization of collateral appeal as civil or secondary' " 8 fails to limit the meaningful access doctrine to appeals of right. Under the Court's theory, due process does not involve counsel on discretionary appeal because the convicted individual, rather than the state, initiates the proceeding. 1 9 However, the state must .provide an attorney on the first appeal of right, which the prisoner prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Id. at 828. The Court then eschewed any categorical mandate. "It should be noted that while adequate law libraries are one constitutionally acceptable method to assure meaningful access to the courts, our decision here, as in Gilmore, does not foreclose alternative means to achieve that goal." Id. at 830. Instead, the Court reiterated its contention that meaningful access "to the courts is the touchstone." Id. But see Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (refusing to use a narrower eighth amendment standard when determining whether a convicted individual was competent to be executed):
Although the condemned prisoner does not enjoy the same presumptions accorded a defendant who has yet to be convicted or sentenced, he has not lost the protection of the Constitution altogether; if the Constitution renders the fact or timing of his execution contingent upon establishment of a further fact, then that fact must be determined with the high regard for truth that befits a decision affecting the life or death of a human being. Thus, the ascertainment of a prisoner's sanity as a predicate to lawful execution calls for no less stringent standards than those demanded in any other aspect of a capital proceeding. Id. at 411. 117 The initial circuit court opinion pointed out the inconsistency inherent in a class of death row inmates making the argument that they had no access to the courts. Giarratano v. Murray, 836 F.2d 1421 , 1423 (4th Cir. 1988 ). The circuit court dissent, however, pointed out Giarratano's extraordinary abilities and that this was a less complicated civil rights action, not a habeas corpus petition. Id. at 1430 (Hall, J., dissenting).
118 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983) ("The role of federal habeas proceedings, while important in assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and limited."); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423 (1963) Because many death row inmates do not have the intellectual capacity or skills to pursue collateral relief, meaningful access requires assistance beyond Virginia's law libraries, staff attorneys, and discretionary appointed attorneys. 12 2 At least one federal court has raised concerns over the general inability of prisoners to file mean-ingful habeas corpus and civil rights claims. 123 Poorly written but meritorious petitions with meaningless string cites and legal phrases could easily fall through the judicial screening process.' 24 Moreover, claims that survived the initial weeding procedure are likely to have faltered when prisoners failed to amend complaints or otherwise respond to the court. 125 Prisoners who did not speak English faced an even greater barrier in gaining access. 126 Furthermore, commentators note an increasing judicial adherence to "abuse of the writ" doctrines 2 7 and expedited procedures for considering multiple habeas petitions.
2 8 These factors combine with inmates' deficient legal skills, habeas law's inherent complexity, and death row prisoners' peculiar emotional problems and time limitations to leave meaningful access realistically impossible. Additionally, as the dissent acknowledged, Virginia's capital procedures make the need for assistance of counsel more compelling because many issues arise only in postconviction appeals. two reasons in addition to the general trend of right to counsel and meaningful access lines of authority compel the appointment of counsel. Id. at 1102.
123 Hooks v. Wainwright, 536 F. Supp. 1330 , 1344 , 1345 (1982 ), rev'd, 775 F.2d 1433 (11 th Cir. 1985 In contrast to the collateral process discussed in Finley, Virginia law contemplates that some claims ordinarily heard on direct review will be relegated to postconvic-
C. THE EFFICIENT AND JUST SOLUTION IS THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN CAPITAL COLLATERAL
PROCEEDINGS
Although the arbitrary line drawn between direct and collateral appeals connotes underlying concerns over the efficient operation and fairness of capital convictions, the Court could have avoided such difficult choices. As to efficiency, current lengthy and repetitive collateral appeal practices diminish the retributive and deterrent purposes of capital punishment. 1 30 Both society and potential criminals do not closely relate crimes warranting capital punishment with the punishment given.1 3 1 In addition, the burgeoning number of federal habeas petitions calls for efficient habeas procedures in both state and federal courts.' 3 2
Habeas petitioners who obtain counsel, however, have a high chance of obtaining some form of relief. 133 Thus, the increase in petitions is not pure abuse of the process. Apparently, significant error exists in capital trials and appeals. Denying to a death row inmate an attorney on collateral appeal is especially unjust. Too large a chance exists that constitutional error occurred in the lower courts and that the prisoner may receive some relief on appeal. tion proceedings. Claims that trial or appellate counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance, for instance, usually cannot be raised until this stage....
... The postconviction procedure in Virginia may present the first opportunity for an attorney detached from past proceedings to examine the defense and to raise claims that were barred on direct review by prior counsel's ineffective assistance. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 Ct. , 2778 Ct. (1989 (Stevens, J., dissenting) .
130 Powell, Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035 , 1041 (1989 . FormerJustice Powell also gave an account of a typical capital trial and appeals process:
[A]fter a bifurcated trial and sentence, the defendant will appeal, first to the state intermediate appeals court, and then to the state supreme court. The defendant may at this point file a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. If the sentence and conviction are approved, the defendant then-often after a considerable lapse of time-initiates state habeas review, appeals to the state supreme court a second time, and again seeks certiorari. Unless relief is obtained, the next step is to seek federal habeas review of alleged errors made by the state courts on constitutional questions. If the federal district court denies relief, the defendanton the first round-usually will obtain a certificate of probable cause and request a stay of execution from the federal court of appeals. Fortunately, the solution does not involve an impossible choice between judicial efficiency and acceptable levels of injustice. Instead, appointing counsel to death row prisoners seeking collateral appeal serves both goals. Counsel appointed early in the proceedings helps weed out non-meritorious claims and presents coherently those issues raising constitutional questions. 3 4 As a result, the judiciary is freed from devoting valuable time to meaningless petitions. 13 5 In addition, a more comprehensive review earlier in the process reduces last minute questions and stays of execution.1 3 6 Finally, society has added assurance that a death sentence is imposed in a constitutionally approved manner where safeguards are provided equally to prisoners.
A simple due process 3 7 analysis places this discussion within a constitutional framework calling for judicial resolution rather than merely leaving the matter to the legislatures. 3 8 The procedural due process test of Mathews v. Eldridge weighs three factors: the private interest at stake, the risk of violating that interest through government action or possible substitutes, and the government's interest in the matter. 139 According to this test, death row inmates have a due process right to state appointed counsel on collateral appeal.
First, the prisoner in a capital case faces the possibility that the state will unconstitutionally deprive him of his lif. Second, the number of successful collateral attacks and a death row inmate's in-134 See Hooks v. Wainwright, 536 F. Supp. 1330 Supp. , 1345 Supp. (1982 Supp. ), rev'd, 775 F.2d 1433 Supp. (1985 Supp. ), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 913 (1986 .
135 Some may suggest that prisoners would continue filing their own pro se petitions even if an appointed attorney categorized their claims as futile. The solution is to require the attorney to submit any claim proposed by the death row inmate. The courts would still enjoy the efficiency of having the non-meritorious claim reduced to perhaps a few crystal clear pages.
136 Powell, supra note 130, at 1040 ("It is only fair to add that a significant part of the delay has been attributable to the difficulty of obtaining counsel for collateral review.").
137
The dissent states the issue as whether or not due process requires attorney appointments in this case. Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 Ct. , 2776 Ct. (1989 (Stevens,J, dissenting) . Mello also recognized an unstated due process analysis in the circuit court's majority opinion. Mello, supra note 105, at 1072.
138 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that " [b] eyond the requirements of Bounds, the matter is one of legislative choice based on difficult policy considerations and the allocation of scarce legal resources. Our decision today rightly leaves these issues to resolution by Congress and the state legislatures. Murray, 109 S. Ct. at 2772 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) ; see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985) (applying the Mathews due process test to appointment of a psychologist in a capital case); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985) ("In short, when a State opts to act in a field where its action has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the Constitution-and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause."); Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (applying due process test to civil appointment of counsel issues). ability to represent himself adequately indicate a high probability that constitutional errors may slip through the system. Moreover, appointing counsel before the pro se petition will likely substantially affect individual cases. 140 Third, the states have no net offsetting costs in providing death row inmates this constitutional safeguard. The cost includes attorneys for only approximately 2000 death row inmates in all states. 41 The benefit, however, includes a more efficient collateral appeals process because fewer frivolous petitions reach the court. Those reaching the court will more clearly state the asserted claim. 14 2
Additionally, an efficient and swifter capital adjudication process better serves both the deterrent and retributive justifications of the death penalty. 143 Criminals may see the death penalty as a more real possibility. 144 Society will more closely associate a crime with its punishment. 45 Finally, the courts will have the appearance of 140 The presence of counsel substantially aids a habeas corpus petitioner in gaining relief. One study found the presence of counsel gave a petitioner a chance of relief 15 times greater than the chance of relief given a pro se applicant. Mello, supra note 122, at 566.
141 Id. at 515. As Mello points out, the trial court did not see as significant the cost of appointed attorneys. Virginia already appointed attorneys for those who could successfully file a nonfrivolous petition. Mello, supra note 105, at 1073. See Giarratano v. Murray, 668 F. Supp. 511, 515 (E.D. Va. 1986) . Similarly, counsel for respondents argued against the proposition that a right to counsel would become a right to effective counsel, and yet another ground for further collateral attack. Brief for Respondent at 17, Murray . Instead, a United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decision based on the Giarralano trial court opinion held that the collateral petitioner had a right to counsel, but not effective counsel. Whitley v. Muncy, 823 F.2d 55, 56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1034 (1987 . However accomplished, the courts could avoid the "floodgates" specter without sacrificing constitutional rights.
142 With this safeguard in place, the Court could conceivably limit further the use of inefficient collateral appeals if it chose to do so. Similarly, these safeguards would allow legislative solutions to habeas corpus abuses without the danger of unfavorable court review.
143 See Powell, supra note 130, at 1041. 144 Id. FormerJustice Powell stated that " [d] elay certainly robs the penalty of much of its deterrent value, 'since the deterrent force of penal laws is diminished to the extent that persons contemplating criminal acitivity believe there is a possibility that they will escape punishment through repetitive collateral attacks. '" Id. (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452-53 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality opinion)).
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 185-86 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens,JJ., plurality opinion), reh 'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976) , the plurality stated:
We may nevertheless assume safely that there are murderers, such as those who act in passion, for whom the threat of death has little or no deterrent effect. But for many others, the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterirent. There are carefully contemplated murders, such as murder for hire, where the possible penalty of death may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act. Id. 145 The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe fairness from which they derive much of their power. Thus, due process calls for the appointment of counsel in state death row collateral appeals.
VI. CONCLUSION
The plurality's decision in Murray fails to offer to death row inmates a constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts as defined in Bounds. 1 4 6 Rather than giving a useful policy justification for its holding, the plurality chose to bury its reasoning in a technical and questionable treatment of the assistance of counsel precedent.
The plurality should have recognized the continuity in the right to assistance of counsel and meaningful access doctrines and extended the right to include state collateral appeals. Both the due process and equal protection clauses of the sixth and fourteenth amendments and the inability of death row inmates to access meaningfully the courts compels this result. Taking an individual's life is too important and irreversible a state action to allow without the procedural safeguard of state appointed attorneys for indigent death row inmates pursuing a crucial part of the criminal adjudication process.
DONALD P. ZEITHAML, JR. that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they "deserve," then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring), reh denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972) .
146 See supra note 30 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bound.
